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Symposium: Interdisciplinary Perspectives
on Fear and Risk Perception in
Times of Democratic Crisis
Foreword
ChristinaE. Wells
Jennifer K. Robbennolt*
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the implementation of the USA
PATRIOT ACT, and the government's indefinite detention of "enemy combatants" have all sparked renewed interest in the balance between security and liberty in times of crisis. Recently, legal scholars have debated topics ranging from
the constitutionality and wisdom of the government's responses to terror to the
appropriate roles for institutional actors and the public in national security decisions. 1 While these debates have contributed enormously to the public discussion
that is the foundation of a democratic society, they have not completely captured
the complexities of governmental responses to crisis. Thus far, the debate has
focused primarily on legal doctrine and theory but such tools can only take us so
far.

* Enoch N. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law.
** Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development and Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Symposium, The ChangingLaws of War. Do We Need a New Legal Regime after September 11?, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183 (July 2004); Symposium, Civil Liberties After September 11th: A Closer Look at Detention Powers, 34
CONN. L. REV. 1143 (2002); Symposium, Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror, 2003
WIS. L. REV. 253; Symposium, Emergency Power and Constitutionalism, 2 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 207 (Apr. 2004); Symposium, Law and the War on Terrorism, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399 (2002); Symposium, Terrorism and the Constitution. Civil
Liberties in a New America, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 881 (May 2004).
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Governmental responses to crisis are complex and influenced by many factors. Be it the executive branch, the legislature, or the courts, the government
consists of individual decision makers who, like the public, are susceptible to
powerful emotional and social forces. Just as fear, prejudice, and inaccuracies in
risk perception increase public pressure on executive, legislative, and judicial
officials to make politically expedient decisions, these psychological biases directly influence government decision makers themselves. This Symposium examines these underlying influences in order to bring greater understanding to our
responses to democratic crises.
The articles and essays included or referenced in this volume discuss both
the factors that affect decision making in times of crisis and their implications for
law and democratic theory. Professor Cass Sunstein's keynote address, Fearand
Liberty,2 noted that psychological biases such as the availability heuristic and
probability neglect can skew risk perception, leading to excessive public fear of
national security risks and unreasonable curtailment of civil liberties. 3 According
to Sunstein, courts, which are typically responsible for protecting civil liberties,
often lack sufficient information to assess whether national security concerns
justify incursions on civil liberties.4 Nevertheless, he concluded that courts can
still provide an essential safeguard against unreasonable infringements (1) by
requiring that executive actions infringing civil liberties be clearly authorized by
legislative enactments, 5 (2) by carefully scrutinizing selective burdens on the civil
presumptions rather
liberties of identifiable minorities, 6 and (3) by using strong
7
than case-by-case balancing in constitutional adjudication.
Professors Lee Epstein and Christina Wells presented papers discussing the
role of courts in reviewing executive decisions in times of crisis. Examining the
hypothesis that courts tend to defer more to the executive when the country is at
war, Epstein and her colleagues conducted a study of all civil liberties cases from
1941 to 2001. While judicial deference has been a longstanding assumption in
the legal community, Epstein et al.'s study is groundbreaking in its attempt to test
that assumption empirically. Their results, which reveal that courts are less likely
to uphold a civil liberties claim during wartime, are sure to inform future debate
about the appropriate role of judges and other institutional actors in cases involving national security.

2. Professor Sunstein's remarks were based upon a forthcoming article and
book chapter. See Cass R. Sunstein, Fear and Security, 71 Soc. REs. (forthcoming
Winter 2004) (manuscript on file with the author); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE LAWS OF
FEAR (forthcoming Mar. 2005).
3. Sunstein, Fearand Security, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 14-15.
6. Id. at 15-17.
7. Id. at 17-19.
8. Professor Epstein's presentation was based upon a forthcoming article. See
Lee Epstein et al., The Effect of War on the Supreme Court, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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Professor Wells's article, the first presented in this volume, examines the
role of courts from a psychological perspective. 9 Specifically, she challenges the
appropriateness of judicial deference by examining executive decision making in
times of crisis. After reviewing several much-criticized government actionssuch as the sedition prosecutions in World War I, the internment of JapaneseAmericans in World War II, and the persecution of Communists during the Cold
War-Professor Wells identifies an underlying pattern of skewed risk assessment
by executive officials that is consistent with certain psychological biases. Positing
that such skewed assessments are quite likely in times of crisis, she proposes that
rigorous judicial review would provide a mechanism of accountability that would
allow executive officials to counter the effects of psychological biases.
Professors Tracey George and Robert Pushaw offered divergent responses
to the presentations by Professors Epstein and Wells. George supports a more
rigorous review of executive decision making and argues that legal scholars
should look outside the law to understand its complexities. Examination of "other
disciplines, methodologies, and [the law of other] countries," she explains, would
provide legal scholars with more sophisticated tools of analysis.10 Professor
Pushaw also acknowledges the contributions that interdisciplinary work can make
to understanding and predicting executive and judicial behavior in times of crisis;
however, he questions whether rigorous judicial review can actually rein in executive decision making. Instead, Pushaw posits that there are occasions in which
the courts should defer to a more fully-informed and flexible executive regardless
of the psychological or political pressures that might skew decision making.II
The next series of essays by Professors Paul Slovic, Neal Feigenson et al.,
and Rachel Moran focuses primarily on the role of emotion in risk perception and
the impact of emotion on law and public policy. Discussing individual perceptions of risk, Professor Slovic argues that while the strong "visceral emotion of
fear" can profoundly influence judgments and behaviors involving risk, more
subtle and often unconscious feelings known collectively as "affect" can exert
equally profound influence. Understanding the cognitive interplay between affect
and reason, he claims, is essential for improving decision making in the face of
risk.' 2 For example, the imagery associated with terrorism may lead the public to
overestimate its risk while underestimating the likelihood of more common but
less vivid and familiar dangers.
Professor Feigenson and his colleagues discuss the influence of group identity on individual risk perception.1 3 Noting, for example, "that Americans are less
worried about genetically engineered food but more worried about nuclear power
9. Christina E. Wells, QuestioningDeference, 69 MO. L. REv. 903 (2004).
10. Tracey E. George, Other Discipline,Methodologies, and Countries: Studying
Courts and Crisis, 69 Mo. L. REv. 951 (2004).
11. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and Wells, 69 Mo. L. Rnv. 959 (2004).
12. Paul Slovic, What's Fear Got to Do with It? It's Affect We Need to Worry
About, 69 Mo. L. REv. 971 (2004).
13. Neal Feigenson et al., Perceptionsof Terrorism and Disease Risks: A Crossnational Comparison,69 Mo. L. REv. 991 (2004).
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than western Europeans are," Feigenson et al. argue that national differences
influence the perception of risk from certain dangers. As described in their article,
they found that U.S. and Canadian citizens responded differently to the risks of
terrorism and SARS. Further, the degree to which participants identified with
their country correlated with some of their risk perceptions and judgments. The
findings inform a variety of public policy issues, from how governments manipulate risk information to how they can improve communication with their citizens
about potential risks.
Professor Moran takes her discussion of emotion in a different direction by
focusing on several dimensions of fear and their relevance to law and legal process. She argues that fear is a complex phenomenon experienced on many levelsi.e., "as a private experience, as an interpersonal communication, and as a public
event." 14 Eschewing pure information-processing (i.e., rational risk assessment)
accounts of fear, which she largely associates with Professor Sunstein, Moran
argues that the expression of that emotion in its many forms has far more relevance to law and legal process than rational risk assessment and that this complex
phenomenon of emotion plays a vital role in both public and private life.
Commenting on these presentations, Professor Chris Guthrie explores the
disparity between emotions evoked in anticipation of a threatened event and those
that occur after threats are actually realized. 5 Relying on psychological research
demonstrating that we tend to overestimate the impact of negative events on our
emotions, he suggests that public policy makers should anticipate our tendency to
overestimate such impacts when making policy.
In his response, Professor Henry Chambers builds on Moran's assessment
that fear defies a simple information-processing definition. 6 For example, because race can affect an individual's perception of risk, public policy prescriptions based upon a pure-information processing model may fail to capture important segments of society. Finally, Professor Thom Lambert critiques two aspects
of the essays by Slovic and Feigenson et al. He suggests that their arguments tend
to "hastily adopt 'non-rational' explanations for otherwise rational behavior" and
17
to "advocate [for] inappropriately paternalistic government policies."
A final series of essays by Professors Corey Robin, Betty Winfield, and
Geof Stone examines fear and risk assessment through the lens of history. Professor Robin's essay "examines the use of fear as an instrument of political repression."' 18 He begins by noting that most philosophers believe doctrines such as
separation of powers, federalism, and the rule of law are necessary checks against
government tyranny. However, using the McCarthy era as a case study, Robin
14. Rachel F. Moran, Fear:A Story in Three Parts,69 Mo. L. REV. 1013 (2004).
15. Chris Guthrie, Risk Realization, Emotion, and Policymaking, 69 Mo. L. REv.
1039 (2004).
16. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Fear,Irrationality,and Risk Perception, 69 MO. L.
REv. 1047 (2004).
17. Thomas A. Lambert, Two Mistakes Behavioralists Make: A Response to
ProfessorsFeigenson et al. and ProfessorSlovic, 69 Mo. L. REv. 1053 (2004).
18. Corey Robin, Fragmented State, PluralistSociety: How Liberal Institutions
PromoteFear,69 MO. L. REv. 1061 (2004).
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argues that these very checks on government tyranny often contribute to fear that
leads to political repression, a term he defines as the attempt to ensure that "the
powerful are obeyed."' 9 He also argues that social pluralism further contributes to
fear and repression by allowing social and political elites to pit groups against
one another.
Professor Betty Winfield surveys the United States Attorney General's role
in repressing civil liberties during times of crisis. 20 Reviewing policy decisions
from World War I, World War II and the Vietnam War, she identifies and discusses four models of attorneys general, ranging from those who aggressively
infringed civil liberties to those who attempted to rein in executive incursions on
such liberties. Against the backdrop of these four models, Winfield examines
Attorney General John Ashcroft's role in the war against terror and finds him
most like past attorneys general who exploited crisis to expand executive power.
Responding to Robin and Winfield and anticipating the final essay by Geof
Stone, Professor Bill Fisch notes initially that "many things ... can go wrong
with our system under the pressures of war or other emergencies. ' 21 The challenge, he argues, is in finding ways to "prevent that breakdown." Using Sunstein's and Stone's proposals as examples, Fisch suggests that "encouraging
courage" may be our best response to fear. Professor Richard Reuben comments
on the entire Symposium by discussing the role of the media in preventing the
breakdown of civil liberties. 22 Arguing that the media have traditionally served a
"constitutional, democracy-enhancing function," he notes with trepidation the
structural and operational obstacles that threaten the media's traditional role as a
watchdog and suggests that reform may be necessary.
Concluding this Symposium issue, Professor Geof Stone examines our
country's historical susceptibility to "war fever," which has led to excessive caution and undue curtailment of civil liberties. 23 While suggesting that we can "do
better," he also acknowledges that our response to potential threats has improved
over time. Finally, Stone offers several concrete actions by which the public,
Congress, and the executive branch can improve decision making in times of
crisis.
This Symposium attempts to expand the scope of inquiry into executive action by considering the influence of fear and other emotions on risk assessment
and response in times of crisis. This inquiry promises to be of considerable importance for some time. Congress is considering new legislation expanding ex-

19. Id.
20. Betty Houchin Winfield, "To Support and Defend the Constitution of the
United States Against All Enemies, Foreign and Domestic": Four Types of Attorneys
General and Wartime Stress, 69 Mo. L. REV. 1095 (2004).
21. William B. Fisch, Encouraging Courage: Law's Response to Fear and Risk,
69 Mo. L. REV. 1115 (2004).
22. Richard C. Reuben, Fear and Risk in "Times of Crisis": The Media s Challenge, 69 Mo. L. REV. 1123 (2004).
23. Geoffrey R. Stone, War Fever, 69 MO. L. REV. 1131 (2004).
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ecutive law enforcement powers. 24 Courts are weighing in on the legality of executive and legislative actions in response to crisis. 25 As the debate regarding the
wisdom of such actions continues, we would do well to broaden our focus to
include a discussion of the multitude of factors that may affect decision making.

24. See, e.g., Tools to Fight Terrorism Act of 2004, S. 2679, 108th Cong. (2004),
in 150 CONG. REc. S9819, S9840-51 (Sept. 28, 2004).
25. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (holding that due process required the United States government to give citizen held as an enemy combatant
meaningful opportunity to contest factual basis for his detention); Humanitarian Law
Project v. United States Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that
statute criminalizing provision of material support to terrorists was unconstitutionally
vague), opinion vacated and rehearing en banc granted 382 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004); Ctr. For Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding government decision to withhold identities of persons
detained by the government immediately after the September I1th attacks); Doe v.
Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that "national security letter"
provision of the USA PATRIOT Act violated the First and Fourth Amendments to the
Constitution).
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